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clash of civilizations


TRIBE Member
If you are interested in reading an article that you would read if you were taking introduction to politics at york this year then try this one on for size.

this is 1 of 4 articles that we have to read this week. Basically it's about this much reading per week in this class which is a fair bit so you basically scan through parts and focus on others.
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Alex D. from TRIBE on Utility Room


TRIBE Member

World politics is entering a new phase in which the great divisions among
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Civilizations,
the highest cultural groupings of people, are differentiated from each
other by religion, history, language, and tradition. These divisions are
deep and increasing in importance. From Yugoslavia to the Middle East
to Central Asia, the fault lines of civilizations are the battle lines
of the future. In this emerging era of cultural conflict, the US must
forge alliances with similar cultures and spread its values wherever possible.
With alien civilizations, the West must be accommodating if possible,
but confrontational if necessary. In the final analysis, however, all
civilizations will have to learn to tolerate each other.
Copyright Council on Foreign Relations Summer 1993


TRIBE Member

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated
to proliferate visions of what it will be--the end of history, the return
of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the
nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among
others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality.
Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics
is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new
world will. not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great
divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be
cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs,
but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations
and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will
dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be
the battle lines of the future.

- -

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution
of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence
of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts
of the Western world were largely among princes--emperors, absolute monarchs
and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their
armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory
they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with
the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations
rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R Palmer put, "The wars of kings were
over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth-century pattern lasted
until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution
and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict
of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy,
and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War,
this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers,
neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and
each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily
conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William
Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the
world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out
of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between
the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations.
In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western
civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western
colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.


During the Cold War the world was divided into the First Second and Third
Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful
now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems
or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms
of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural
entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups,
all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity.
The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of
a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture
that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in
turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese
communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any
broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization
is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level
of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans
from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such
as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective
self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident
of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman,
an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization
to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which
he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and,
as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.

Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a civilization
pretending to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number
of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include
several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and
Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization.
Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations.
Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American,
and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are
nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom
sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall, they
divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear
and are buried in the sands of time.

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global
affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader
reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study
of History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six
of them exist in the contemporary world.


Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and
the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven
or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese,
Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization.
The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural
fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic.
Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language,
culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different
civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man,
the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children,
husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance
of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.
These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear.
They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies
and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and
conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however,
differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the
most violent conflicts.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place The interactions between
peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions
intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between
civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration
to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased
receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans
react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments
from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed
out, "An Ibo may be...an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern
region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian.
In New York, he is an African." The interactions among peoples of different
civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in
turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to
stretch back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout
the world are separating people from long-standing local identities. They
also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world
religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements
that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western
Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most
countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements
are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and
business persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has
remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth
century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel
labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends
national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual
role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the
same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon
is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references
to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end
of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western
ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle
East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris
Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests
that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape
the world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people
who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the
Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At
the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply
imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are
being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring
in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American,
cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence
less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones.
In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can
become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and
Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the
key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose
sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question
is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know,
from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question
can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates
sharply and exclusively among people. A person can half-French and half-Arab
and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult
to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade
that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59
percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent
to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs
is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful
economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness, On the
other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in
a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation
of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North
American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican,
Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties
in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is
a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and
investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its
cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude
its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North

Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion
of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian
countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly
overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer
together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration,
the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered
on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray
Weidenbaum has observed,

Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based
economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce
and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology
and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing
and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore),
a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments
of land, resources and labor (mainland China)....From Guangzhou to Singapore,
from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network--often based on extensions
of the traditional clans--has been described as the backbone of the East
Asian economy.(1)

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization,
which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan
and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization,
founded originally in the 1960S by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization
by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of
admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central American
Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts
to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging
the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are
likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves
and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically
defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional
ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture
and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human
rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical
propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to
Mindanao. Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values
of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military
predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering
responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support
and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will
increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion
and civilization identity.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level,
adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often
violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level,
states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic
power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third
parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious


The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological
boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed.
The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and
ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As
the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division
of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity
and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line
in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary
of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are
now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states
and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic
western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating
Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia
almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from
the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides
with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The
peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic;
they shared the common experiences of European history--feudalism, the
Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution,
the Industrial Revolution; they are generally economically better off than
the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement
in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political
systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or
Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and
were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe;
they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely
to develop stable democratic political systems. The Velvet Curtain of culture
has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing
line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line
of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict.

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations
has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab
and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh
to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success
to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth
to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended
their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople,
and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western
control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.

After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires
disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested
themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries
for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when
they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel
(created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria
for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956;
American forces went into Lebanon in 1958; subsequently American forces
returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters
with Iran, Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle
Eastern governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western
planes and installations and seized Western hostages. This warfare between
Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive
army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression
by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to
potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."

This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely
to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs
feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the
West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's
military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military
dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many
Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of
economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become
inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some
openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal
beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab
world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces.
This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between
Islamic countries and the West.

Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular population
growth in Arab countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to increased
migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward
minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities with
respect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly
open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish migrants
have become more intense and more widespread since 199O.

On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash
of civilization. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar,
an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world.
It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan
that the struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes
to a similar conclusion:

We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues
and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than
a clash of civilizations--the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction
of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present,
and the worldwide expansion of both.(2)

Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic
civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian
black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized
in the image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected
in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting
in Chad between Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions
between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the
political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims
and Christians in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of
Christianity are likely to enhance the probability of violence along this
fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the
Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February 1993 attacking the actions
of the Sudan's Islamist government against the Christian minority there.

On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between
Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo,
the simmering violence between Serb and Albanian, the tenuous relations
between Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians
and Ingush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris,
the tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and the
deployment of Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the Caucasus
and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities
and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their southern borders.
This concern is well captured by Archie Roosevelt:

Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between the Slavs and the
Turkic peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of
the Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long
confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding
not only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian
realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group
that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.(3)

The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic
clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now
not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying
religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups
and India's substantial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya
mosque in December 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India
will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In East Asia,
China outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has
pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of Tibet, and it is
pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy toward its Turkic-Muslim minority.
With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the
United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights,
trade and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate
A "new cold war," Deng Xaioping reportedly asserted in 1991, is under way
between China and America.

The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations
between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates
economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but
at least on the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural.
The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could
hardly be more different. The economic issues between the United States
and Europe are no less serious than those between the United States and
Japan, but they do not have the same political salience and emotional intensity
because the differences between American culture and European culture are
so much less than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.

The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which
they are likely to be characterized by violence. Economic competition clearly
predominates between the American and European subcivilizations of the
West and between both of them and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however,
the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic
cleansing," has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and
most violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia
the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame.
This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic
bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also
occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans,
Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the
Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.


TRIBE Member

Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in
war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support
from other members of their own civilization. As the post-Cold War world
evolves, civilization commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has termed the
"kin-country" syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional
balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation
and coalitions. It can be seen gradually emerging in the post-Cold War
conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was
a full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements
of civilizational rallying, which seemed to become more important as the
conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future.

First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then fought a
coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While only a few Muslim governments
overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many Arab elites privately cheered him
on, and he was highly popular among large sections of the Arab publics.
Islamic fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq rather than
the Western-backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Forswearing
Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal.
He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a war between civilizations.
"It is not the world against Iraq," as Safar Al-Hawali, dean of Islamic
Studies at the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, put it in a widely circulated
tape. "It is the West against slam." Ignoring the rivalry between Iran
and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called
for a holy war against the West: "The struggle against American aggression,
greed, plans and policies will be counted as a jihad, and anybody who is
killed on that path is a martyr." "This is a war," King Hussein of Jordan
argued, "against all Arabs and all Muslims and not against Iraq alone."

The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publics behind
Saddam Hussein caused those Arab governments in the anti-Iraq coalition
to moderate their activities and temper their public statements. Arab governments
opposed or distanced themselves from subsequent Western efforts to apply
pressure on Iraq, including enforcement of a no-fly zone in the summer
of 1992 and the bombing of Iraq in January 1983. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab
anti-Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost only
the West and Kuwait against Iraq.

Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure
to protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for
violating U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged, was using a double
standard. A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world
of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and
a different standard to others.

Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in the former
Soviet Union. Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1983 stimulated Turkey
to become increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic
brethren in Azerbaijan. "We have a Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments
as the Azerbaijanis," said one Turkish official in 1992. We are under pressure.
Our newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are asking us if
we are still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. Maybe we should
show Armenia that there's a big Turkey in the region." President Turgut
Ozal agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the Armenians
a little bit." Turkey, Ozal threatened again in 1993, would "show its fangs."
Turkish Air Force jets flew reconnaissance flights along the Armenian border,
Turkey suspended food shipments and air flights to Armenia; and Turkey
and Iran announced they would not accept dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In
the last years of its existence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan
because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end
of the Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way to religious
ones. Russian troops fought on the side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan
accused the "Russian government of turning 180 degrees" toward support
for Christian Armenia.

Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics
manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors
they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was
expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation
in the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the
Yugoslav breakup, Germany, in an unusual display of diplomatic initiative
and muscle, induced the other 11 members of the European Community to follow
its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the pope's
determination to provide strong backing to the two Catholic countries,
the Vatican extended recognition even before the Community did. The United
States followed the European lead. Thus the leading actors in Western civilization
rallied behind their coreligionists. Subsequently Croatia was reported
to be receiving substantial quantities of arms from Central European and
other Western countries. Boris Yeltsin's government, on the other hand,
attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic to the Orthodox
Serbs but not alienate Russia from the West. Russian conservative and nationalist
groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government for
not being more forthcoming in its support for the Serbs. By early 1983
several hundred Russians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces,
and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia.

Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West
for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims
from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the U.N.
arms embargo, Iran supped weapons and men for the Bosnians; Iranian-supported
Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to train and organize the Bosnian forces.
In 1983 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were
reported to be fighting in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and
other countries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups
in their own societies to provide more vigorous support for the Bosnians.
By the end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding
for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly increased
their military capabilities vis-a-vis the Serbs.

In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from countries
that politically were fascist, communist and democratic. In the 1990s the
Yugoslav conflict is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim,
Orthodox and Western Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight
against fascism in the Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those
who died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."

Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within
the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense
and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common
membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations
where it might otherwise occur. In 199I and 1992 many people were alarmed
by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over
territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and
economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood
of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two
Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with
each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for
conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating
and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been
serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former
Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox
Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between
Russians and Ukrainians.

Civilization rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing,
and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts
in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the positions of
nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational
lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found
it a potent means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments.
In the coming years, local conflicts most likely to escalate into major
wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines
between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war
between civilizations.


The West is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other
civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military
conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power
is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It
dominates international political and security institutions and with Japan
international economic institutions. Global political and security issues
are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain
and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the United States,
Germany and Japan, all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations
with each other to the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries.
Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary
Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the word as
reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase "the world
community" has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the Free
World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of
the United States and other Western powers.(4) Through the IMF and other
international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests
and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate.
In any poll of non-Western peoples, the IMF Undoubtedly would win the support
of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable
rating from just about everyone else, who would agree with Georgy Arbatov's
characterization of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who love expropriating
other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic
and political conduct and stifling economic freedom."

Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, tempered
only by occasional abstention by China, produced U.N. legitimation of the
West's use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and its elimination of
Iraq's sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. It also
produced the quite unprecedented action by the United States, Britain and
France in getting the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the
Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused.
After defeating the largest Arab army, the West did not hesitate to throw
its weight around in the Arab world. The West in effect is using international
institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in
ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests
and promote Western political and economic values.

That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new world, and
there is a significant element of truth in their view. Differences in power
and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one
source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences
in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict.
V. S. Naipaul has argued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization"
that "fits all men." At a superficial level much of Western culture has
indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however,
Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations.
Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights,
equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation
of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian,
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate
such ideas produce instead a reaction against "human rights imperialism"
and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support
for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures.
The very notion that there could be a "universal civilization" is a Western
idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and
their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. Indeed, the
author of a review of 100 comparative studies of values in different societies
concluded that "the values that are most important in the West are least
important worldwide."(5) In the political realm, of course, these differences
are most manifest in the efforts of the United States and other Western
powers to induce other peoples to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy
and human rights. Modern democratic government originated in the West.
When it has developed in non-Western societies it has usually been the
product of Western colonialism or imposition.

The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore
Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the
responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values.(6)
Those responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. At
one extreme, non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt
to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration
or "corruption" by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation
in the Western-dominated global community. The costs of this course, however,
are high, and few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative,
the equivalent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is
to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions. The
third alternative is to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic
and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against
the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short,
to modernize but not to Westernize.


In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries
with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations, such as the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries
have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether
their society belongs to one civilization or another. These are torn countries.
Their leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make
their countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions
of their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical torn
country is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed
in the Attaturk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western
nation state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf
War; they applied for membership in the European Community, At the same
time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival
and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society.
In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western
society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such. Turkey
will not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason,
as President Ozal said, "is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and
they don't say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by
Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. The end of
the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a
revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders
of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous
efforts to carve out this new identity for itself.

During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat similar to
that of Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe
and attempted to join Europe, Mexico has stopped defining itself by its
opposition to the United States and is instead attempting to imitate the
United States and to join it in the North American Free Trade Area. Mexican
leaders are engaged in the great task of redefining Mexican identity and
have introduced fundamental economic reforms that eventually will lead
to fundamental political change. In 1991 a top adviser to President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari described at length to me all the changes the Salinas
government was making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most impressive.
It seems to me that basically you want to change Mexico from a Latin American
country into a North American country." He looked at me with surprise and
exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely what we are trying to do, but of
course we could never say so publicly." As his remark indicates, in Mexico
as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of
their country's identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to
make gestures to Islam (Ozal's pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico's North
American-oriented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico
to be a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara summit).

Historically Turkey has been the most profoundly torn country. For the
United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country. Globally the
most important torn country is Russia. The question of whether Russia is
part of the West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization
has been a recurring one in Russian history. That issue was obscured by
the communist victory in Russia, which imported a Western ideology, adapted
it to Russian conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that
ideology. The dominance of communism shut off the historic debate over
Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited Russians
once again face that question.

President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and seeking
to make Russia a "normal" country and a part of the West. Yet both the
Russian elite and the Russian public are divided on this issue. Among the
more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stankevich argues that Russia should reject
the "Atlanticist course, which would lead it "to become European, to become
a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the
eighth member of the Seven, and to put particular emphasis on Germany and
the United States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance."
While also rejecting an exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless
argues that Russia should give priority to the protection of Russians in
other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections, and promote
((an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our options, our ties,
and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern direction." People of
this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinating Russia's interests
to those of the West, for reducing Russian military strength, for failing
to support traditional friends such as Serbia, and for pushing economic
and political reform in ways injurious to the Russian people. Indicative
of this trend is the new popularity of the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who
in the 1920s argued that Russia was a unique Eurasian civilization.(7)
More extreme dissidents voice much more blatantly nationalist, anti-Western
and anti-Semitic views, and urge Russia to redevelop its military strength
and to establish closer ties with China and Muslim countries. The people
of Russia are as divided as the elite. An opinion survey in European Russia
in the spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positive
attitudes toward the West and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it
has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s is truly a
torn country.

To redefine its civilization identity, a torn country must meet three requirements.
First, its political and economic elite has to be generally supportive
of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be willing
to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient
civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert. All three requirements
in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large part
exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with
respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between liberal democracy
and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major
differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and
prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could have
quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual
debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually impossible for him
to do that with a Russian traditionalist. If, as the Russians stop behaving
like Marxists, they reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians
but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West could
again become distant and conflictual.(8)


The obstacles to non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably.
They are east for Latin American and East European countries. They are
greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are
still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan
has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of
the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West
in important dimensions. Those countries that for reason of culture and
power do not wish to, or cannot, join the West compete with the West by
developing their own economic, military and political power. They do this
by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other non-Western
countries. The most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic
connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and

Almost without exception, Western countries are reducing their military
power; under Yeltsin's leadership so also is Russia. China, North Korea
and several Middle Eastern states, however, are significantly expanding
their military capabilities. They are doing this by the import of arms
from Western and non-Western sources and by the development of indigenous
arms industries. One result is the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer
has called "Weapon States," and the Weapon States are not Western states.
Another result is the redefinition of arms control, which is a Western
concept and a Western goal. During the Cold War the primary purpose of
arms control was to establish a stable military balance between the United
States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold
War world the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development
by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western
interests. The West attempts to do this through international agreements,
economic pressure and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.

The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses
largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering
them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities
for achieving that goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal
norm and nonproliferation treaties inspections as means of realizing that
norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote
the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those
who do not. The attention of the West focuses, naturally, on nations that
are actually or potentially hostile to the West.

The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire
and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security.
They also have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the
Indian defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf
War: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously,
as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power. China,
of course, already has nuclear weapons; Pakistan and India have the capability
to deploy them. North Korea, ran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be
attempting to acquire them. A top Iranian official has declared that all
Muslim states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 the president
of Iran reportedly issued a directive calling for development of "offensive
and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."

Centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities
is the sustained expansion of China's military power and its means to create
military power. Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly
increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the
modernization of its armed forces. It is purchasing weapons from the former
Soviet states; it is developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested
a one-megaton nuclear device. It is developing power-projection capabilities,
acquiring aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft
carrier. Its military buildup and assertion of sovereignty over the South
China Sea are provoking a multilateral regional arms race in East Asia.
China is also a major exporter of arms and weapons technology. It has exported
materials to Libya and Iraq that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons
and nerve gas. It has helped Algeria build a reactor suitable for nuclear
weapons research and production. China has sold to Iran nuclear technology
that American officials believe could only be used to create weapons and
apparently has shipped components of 300-mile-range missiles to Pakistan.
North Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while
and has sold advanced missiles and missile technology to Syria and Iran.
The flow of weapons and weapons technology is generally from East Asia
to the Middle East. There is, however, some movement in the reverse direction;
China has received Stinger missiles from Pakistan.

A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed
to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies
needed to counter the military power of the West. It may or may not last.
At present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said, "a renegades' mutual
support pact, run by the proliferators and their backers." A new form of
arms competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and
the West. In an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms
to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new
form of arms competition, one side is developing its arms and the other
side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up
while at the same time reducing its own military capabilities.


This article does not argue that civilization identities will replace all
other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization
will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization
will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth
the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important;
civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations
will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global
form of conflict, international relations, historically a game played out
within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become
a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects;
successful political, security and economic international institutions
are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations;
conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent,
more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same
civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations
are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could
lead to global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations
between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western countries
will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face
major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for
the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations.
It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be
like. If these are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider
their implications for Western policy. These implications should be divided
between short-term advantage and long-term accommodation. In the short
term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation
and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European
and North American components; to incorporate into the West societies in
Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the
West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan;
to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major
inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength
of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western military
capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia;
to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states;
to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values
and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and
legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement
of non-Western states in those institutions.

In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization
is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to
become modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded
in this quest. Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire
the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being
modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional
culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the
West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate
these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the
West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of
the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military
power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations.
It will. also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding
of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations
and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests.
It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western
and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal
civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which
will have to learn to coexist with the others.


TRIBE Member
Originally posted by dj_jake_the_snake
If you are interested in reading an article that you would read if you were taking introduction to politics at york this year then try this one on for size.

this is 1 of 4 articles that we have to read this week. Basically it's about this much reading per week in this class which is a fair bit so you basically scan through parts and focus on others.

hehe, you've been timelined monsieur. ;) (I'm too lazy to go find the thread, but Huntington's FP essay has come up in conversation before).

I think his essay is flawed, but many of you who know me would hardly find this surprising.

I'll give you a hint though: Huntington basically stripped a bunch of ideas from Bernard Lewis' famous essay entitled "The Roots of Muslim Rage" (written in 1990) and reformulated it in his 1993 Foreign Policy piece. What's tempting about his central thesis, is that it's nice and simple. It abstracts the argument to a conversation more about how our "ways of life" (culture, economy yadda yadda) begin to (inevitably) encroach on one another, which subtly implies a deferral of accountability as well as a mechanism for discussing issues in the context of "us" (who are the good guys) and "them" (who are the bad guys).

You'll notice that Huntington's thesis is used heavily when politicians go and talk about foreign policy. And politicians generally say stupid things, which speaks volumes for Huntington's essay. ;)
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TRIBE Member
Which course are you reading this book for? The Prof.? I had to read this when I was at York as well. It tends to have a Us Vs. Them them to it. Luckily I had a TA from Iraq that ripped the book to shreds. Is Hooshiyar Kooshiyar still T.A.ing at York?


TRIBE Member
Huntington is a repulsive man. He is an authoritarian in the truest sense of the word. Much of his earlier work revolves around political order at any cost. A report he co-authored with Michel Crozier and Joji Watanuki in 1975 suggested that the political problems that industrial democracies were facing, such as more militant labour movements, civil rights movements, and so on, was a result of there being too much democracy. What is particularly striking about Huntington's works is that some countries' public policies are predicated on his idea of political order. That is to say, governments must insulate themselves from popular pressures to make their societies governable. China is the prime example of this.

But Huntington has become even more influential in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century through the clap-trap contained in his The Clash of Civilizations and The Third Wave. Both tomes are little more than calls for Western imperialism since he essentializes non-Western societies as being base and violent, incapable of internalizing democratic values, i.e. free markets and representative democracy. Indeed, he argues that the only places in East Asia that are democratic are those which the US occupied in one form or another: Japan and South Korea. Huntington makes explicit reference to these two countries. The Middle East, according to Huntington's argument, hasn't been sufficiently occupied. Interestingly, though, Huntington conveniently ignores the fact that the most atavistic regimes in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular) are client states of the US. Any serious historical inquiry into Middle East politics will show that the US openly sought to defeat progressive, secular forces and instead support fundamentalist movements during the Cold War. Hence why the world is where it is today.

And Man Slut, Khashayar Hooshiyar has graduated from the York PhD program. The last I heard, he was teaching at York part-time.


TRIBE Member
Originally posted by Neo-Marxist
And Man Slut, Khashayar Hooshiyar has graduated from the York PhD program. The last I heard, he was teaching at York part-time.

I love that guy! He was always pissed off. I would always try to get him on a rant. I learnt a lot from him. Do you know what courses he's teaching?