9/11 Integrity Failure: How Excellent US Intel Work Was Hampered by Careerists

[SellyCat]

I researched and wrote this paper. It was nominated for an award by the President of the Canadian Association of Security Intelligence Studies (CASIS), named Wessley Wark.

The paper explores and analyses the many ways in which the intelligence community was fully aware that an attack of a certain kind was imminant. While this foreknowledge was never denied by the intelligence community, the publicly available sources are full of information about specific individuals and cases where excellent intelligence feildwork was ruined by the decisions of managers more interested in their career than in taking risks on the courageous men and women who bent over backwards to stop the attack. The research is fully referenced with nearly 200 citations and a complete bibliography.

It's 30 pages long, but I've been told that it's a very fast-paced and interesting read. The first part talks about how the US coopted, facilitated and amplified Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan and trained those who became Al Quaeda in the finest methods of terrorism. This shows they knew what was out there, because they helped create it. This is followed by a history of contemporary Islamic Militancy, including Osama Bin Laden and his associates and how they operated with the help of the CIA and other intelligence agencies in the region. Next is an account of how obvious it was that very militant Islamic propaganda was spewing out of the US's best friend, Saudi Arabia--and how this propaganda was flooding European Islamic communities, with no attempt to hide the fact from the authorities. The US corporate oil connection is to blame for this lapse.

The latter sections involve a detailed--and very interesting--analysis of exactly how the US intelligence aparatus operates and how it became aware that something was going to happen. This section includes descriptions of operating procedures and the individuals who tried their hardest to get this information to the top. Included in this section is the individual, David Fraska, who went out of his way to keep this information from being of any value. I also criticise the media, the affect of partisan politics on the intelligence process (particularly Louis Freeh and his relationship to the Saudi ambassador and powerful republicans. I also directly show how he lied about a clinton cover-up). I also draw out the money trail that leads from the Saudi Ambassador's wife to the two Hijackers that crashed a plane into the pentagon.

Here it is: Integrity Failure

 

[SellyCat]

These are the first two paragraphs:

The 9/11 Commission concluded that, above all, a “failure of imagination”1 within the government caused a systemic inability to prevent the attacks against New York and Washington. This conclusion is both naïve and unjust. The tragic intelligence failure of September 11 was not merely the result of cumbersome bureaucracies and institutional rivalries. Establishing the organizational factors that promoted the failure is crucial, but only represents half the story. This episode exposed a severe integrity deficit among individuals within the intelligence community,especially in the FBI. The CIA is also responsible for ignoring the proliferation of Jihadist ideology among terrorists that it was using as proxy forces against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Moreover, both agencies suffered from cultural dysfunctions that discouraged or obstructed the courageous leaps of intuition that could have prevented the attacks.

Former CIA agent Chalmers Johnson defines the CIA term “blowback” as “the unintended consequences of foreign operations that were deliberately kept secret from the American public so that when retaliation comes, the American public is not able to put it in context, to put cause and effect together.”2 The existence of the Islamic radicalism that caused the horrors of September 11 was itself blowback. The CIA either failed to notice or was unwilling to address the mutation and uncontrolled spread of the Jihadist ideology that they enthusiastically promoted against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

 

[deafplayer]

Former CIA agent Chalmers Johnson...

woa, I didnt know he was former CIA.......... until I read your paper, that is (actually I missed it until I read the preview paragraphs here)

in any case I like that your type of explanation is one that heightens issues of accountability rather than emphasizing mysterious inexplicable "mistakes"

 

[SellyCat]

Because it's so long, I'll be posting a few paragraphs at a time. This way, every day, you'll read some new--actually documented--realities about September 11th.

US policy throughout the Cold War was concerned with the stability of its allies in the Middle East. The US saw Iran and Saudi Arabia as “twin pillars”3 of American policy in the Gulf, acting together to ensure the region’s stability. In the case of Iran, the CIA overthrew its government in 1953 for attempting to nationalise its oil industry. In the after action report, the CIA warned that “Possibilities of blowback against the United States should always be in the back of the minds of all CIA officers involved in this kind of operation. Few, if any, operations are as explosive as this type.”4 That blowback came in the form of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, in which Ayatollah Khomeini established a violently anti-American government.

The firm alliance between America and Saudi Arabia was a natural target of Iranian Revolutionary propaganda that sought to discredit the Kingdom and identify Iran as the only source of Islamic legitimacy. That year, Saudi dissidents inspired by the Iranian example captured the Grand Mosque in Mecca and demanded that Saudi Arabia end its imitation of corrupt Western values. “We killed the extremists of 1979,” explained Dr. Sulaiman Al Hattlan, “but a few months after we killed them, we adopted their ideology.”5 The Saudi government diverted vast sums of money to religious schools that taught Wahabism “as the only true form of Islam and holy war against infidels as the obligation of every believer.”6 This was based on Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahabb’s revival of Hambalism in Saudi Arabia.7 The Hambali school of Jurisprudence is the most fundamentalist school of Sunni Islam and was promoted by Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiya in the 14th century, as the only legitimate practice of Islam.8 In the twentieth century, his philosophies have become the doctrinal basis for the rise of militant Sunni Islamic fundamentalism. Dr. Al Hattlan: “I think the whole culture of education in Saudi Arabia gave people dangerous tools; tools to teach people how to hate; tools of hatred; tools of anger, not tools of understanding the realities of the world.”9

3 Nazer, p.95
4 AJAX After Action Report
5 "The House of Saud."
6 "The House of Saud."
7 Long; ed. Esposito, p.103-104
8 Benjamin, Simon, p.124-126
9 "The House of Saud."

 

[SellyCat]

Next:

The Saudi government also helped establish international Islamic charities whose purpose was to distribute oil wealth to Muslim causes. These charities paid for the establishment of thousands of mosques and madrassas in countries around the world, including the US, UK and Europe.10 A newly educated class of Wahabi preachers staffed these institutions and began disseminating their uniquely rejectionist brand of Islam. In tandem with this ideological exportation of Jihad, the charities also paid for various international armed struggles being fought by Muslims. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided a unique symbol of godless oppression against which to direct this newly created Jihadist fervour. Saudi Arabia secretly agreed with the US to contribute an equal amount to finance the war.11 It was an excellent opportunity for the Royal Family to diffuse the tension that had built up in the Kingdom. By exporting the fighters, the government ensured they had a cause for which to fight—a cause other than overthrowing their own corrupt rulers. Disseminating a radical ideology was only a means to placate the population’s increasing resistance to secularising modernity.

Saudi Arabia’s strategic, economic and political importance represented a colossal disincentive for American politicians to accuse it of being a nexus of violent anti-Americanism. This disincentive trickled down to the intelligence community, which then ignored the organized and deliberate radicalization of the Saudi population. Just a few years later, the CIA greatly increased their support of Islamic extremists in Afghanistan. That policy directly encouraged the formation of a sophisticated, decentralised and deadly international terrorist network devoted to the destruction of the United States.

The group we now call “al-Qaeda” had its origins as two organizations that merged into one. The first was the “Afghan Services Bureau,” headed by Osama Bin Laden’s first spiritual mentor, Abdullah Azzam. Its purpose was to recruit and support Muslim fighters (Mujahideen) for the “Jihad” against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.12 The second was Ayman al-Zawahri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which assassinated Anwar Sadat and attempted to spread violent Islamic revolutions throughout the Middle East.13

Azzam and Bin Laden imported tens of thousands of Arabs into Afghanistan, using money from Saudi Arabia(14) and logistical support from many countries in the Middle East, especially Pakistan.15 Those countries released violent Islamic radicals from prison and hoped they would die fighting against the Red Army.16 To this end, Egypt released the most dangerous radicals in the region: Zawahri and his followers from al-Jihad.17 The CIA enthusiastically armed and trained these fighters, a core group of whom already possessed an extraordinary zeal for killing and dying in defence of Islam. American money and weapons poured into Afghanistan and “CIA agents trained the Mujahideen in the techniques of assassination and terror, including car bombing.”18

10 "The House of Saud."
11 "The House of Saud."
12 Benjamin, Simon, p.264
13 "In the Name of the State."
14 “House of Saud.”
15 "The Phantom Victory."
16 "The Phantom Victory."
17 "The Phantom Victory."
18 "The Phantom Victory."

 

[SellyCat]

Next dose:

However, the indoctrination of these fighters included the notion that politics, by definition, was un-Islamic. Sharia Law and the Qur’an, according to this view, represented the only truth and therefore Muslims did not require any kind of government, other than the literal word of the Qur’an. Zawahri’s interpretation of Jihad was even more radical than Abdallah Azzam’s.19 According to Zawahri’s worldview, Islam was under attack both from external and internal forces. American influence, he argued, was an all-corrupting force that caused Muslims to become selfish, materialistic and anti-Islamic. He demonised democracy as an American instrument for proliferating the consumer culture that it used to dominate other societies. Though radical, this brand of fundamentalism was only a marginal upgrade of Azzam’s already intense religious fervour directed against the Soviets. Ultimately, Zawahri convinced Osama Bin Laden that Azzam’s approach lacked sufficient moral clarity and strength of purpose. Furthermore, Zawahri wanted to wage Jihad against America, while Azzam wanted to focus on defeating Israel.20 Azzam was murdered, and Bin Laden united his network with Zawahri’s Islamic Jihad group.21

So, while the CIA funded, trained and armed Islamic fighters to defeat the Soviet Union, it simultaneously helped promote an ideology that necessarily opposed American conceptions of international order. The CIA was too committed to the Afghan project to care that this extreme belief was sprouting among the thousands of fighters to which it was teaching the most sophisticated guerrilla tactics available to anyone.

American political leaders allowed—and probably encouraged—Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam to raise funds and recruit fighters within the US. They established their American headquarters in Brooklyn, from where Bin Laden raised money and recruited fighters.22 Two years after Azzam’s murder, his protégé in charge of the Brooklyn headquarters, Mustapha Shalabi, was also murdered.23 Bin Laden sent his own personal secretary to replaced Shalabi.24 Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, deputised Bin Laden as the government’s recruiter-in-chief.25 (Incidentally, Faisal and Bill Clinton were close friends.26) The CIA, as well as other national governments and intelligence services, fully supported these efforts. This earnest collusion coloured perceptions and blinded policy makers to the intense blowback caused by radicalising and then empowering Islamic extremists. Al-Qaeda’s operations in America did not concern the FBI, because the political climate there was staunchly supportive of the Afghan militants—president Reagan even dedicated a shuttle launch to them.27

By not addressing the enthusiastic anti-Americanism of the fighters it was training, the CIA failed to acknowledge the threat they posed. For the United States, Afghanistan was a wildly successful Cold War operation that existed in isolation. Through the KGB, Soviet president Michael Gorbachev secretly warned the Reagan administration of the folly it was committing. He accurately predicted that if America allowed the Mujahedeen to take over, Afghanistan would fall into the hands of the most radical and violent Islamic extremists.28 The Taliban became the manifestation of that warning. The warning had no effect, and in 1995 the American government directly facilitated the Taliban’s brutally violent conquest of Afghanistan, in the hope of securing a lucrative pipeline contract for Unocal, a massive American oil company.29 After invading Afghanistan in 2001, the US appointed Hamid Karzai, a former Unocal consultant, as the new president.

19 "In the Name of the State."30
20 Benjamin, Simon, p.278
21 “In the Name of the State.”
22 Benjamin, Simon, p.269
23 Benjamin, Simon, p.278
24 Benjamin, Simon, p.278
25 Bergen, p.55
26 Baer, p.65
27 “The Phantom Victory”
28 “The Phantom Victory”
29 Baer, p.65
30 “The Oil Factor”

 

[SellyCat]

...

The Taliban’s ultra-fundamentalism made them perfect partners for Zawahri and Bin Laden, who offered their strategic and military services in exchange for a territorial base of operations.31 Al-Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna testified to the 9/11 Commission that “throughout the 1990s, Afghanistan became a terrorist Disney Land”.32 He describes how “Al-Qaeda built, with the assistance of the Taliban, a state of the art terrorist training and operational infrastructure in Afghanistan.”33

These contradictions are representative of America’s myopic obsession with the Cold War. All other policy priorities were subordinated to the single-minded containment of the so-called “evil empire.” Thus, short-term considerations trumped the long-term dangers associated with strengthening avowedly anti-American Islamic elements. During this period, the intelligence community had always focused exclusively on state governments. As such, it was largely unaccustomed to evaluating non-state actors in terms of national security threats. This phenomenon delayed considerably the intelligence community’s identification of al-Qaeda as a coordinated, focused and determined national security threat.

The Jihadist ideology disseminated by Afghan and Saudi radicals found fertile soil in the minds of young, isolated Muslim immigrants in Europe. Young Muslim men who became disgusted with the consumer culture into which they could not integrate clung to their local communities. These tight-knit social groupings gravitated around their local mosques and Islamic bookstores, which reinforced their sense of identity and belonging. Islamic charities—most from Saudi Arabia—funded and facilitated the distribution of Jihadist literature and preachers into these communities.

One of the most radicalised Muslim enclaves in Europe was in London, England. According to BBC reporter Jane Corbin, “London was a nexus of Islamic radicalism” so dense that they began referring to it as "Londonistan."34 In 1994, Robert Baer, a CIA Directorate of Operations field officer (and former director of Iraqi operations), toured Islamic bookstores in London and discovered “one cheaply printed volume after another of radical Islamic tracts—burning calls for holy war against the United States.” Baer wrote, "It didn't take a sophisticated intelligence organization to figure out that Europe...had become a hothouse of Islamic fundamentalism."35 Indeed Osama Bin Laden placed more phone calls to London than anywhere else on the planet.36

However, the CIA station in London had no Arabic speakers.37 In addition, the agency had been lowering its global footprint after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The remaining agents "spent most of their time catering to whatever was in fashion in Washington at the time.”38 A new policy, created in 1995, subjected the agency to an "asset scrub" to purge murderers and criminals off their payroll.39 The agency was embarrassed by the revelation that they routinely paid money to a Guatemalan Colonel who had killed and tortured Americans.40 Other bureaucratic obstacles limited the CIA’s ability to recruit agents within al-Qaeda. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Congress stipulated that “the recruitment of agents who violated human rights or engaged in terrorist activities could only be done with the approval of the Deputy Director of Operations.”41 Seeking that permission was both time-consuming and frowned upon by the deputy director himself. “Since recruiting al-Qaeda meant, by definition, recruiting terrorists, it cut down on human sources enormously.”42

31 “In the Name of the State”
32 9/11 Commission Report DVD
33 9/11 Commission Report DVD
34 Powers
35 Powers
36 Powers
37 Powers
38 Powers
39 Powers
40 Powers
41 Friedman, p. 71
42 Friedman, p. 71

 

[atbell]

You wouldn't happen to have a printable copy of your paper would you?

Reading on line isn't all that fun when it gets down to it.

 

[SellyCat]

You wouldn't happen to have a printable copy of your paper would you?

Reading on line isn't all that fun when it gets down to it.

Yeah man, it's in the first post...link to a pdf file

 

[atbell]

Thanks, I'll have to go over it when I can swing by a print shop.

 

[junglisthead]

you wanna talk about banning someone

if i here you patting your back one more time over this dribble of an essay, i think im going to puke

your supposed insight to how the "jihadists" (LOL) work is a sham, and is just more typical western babble, that is so way off course from the truth

 

[SellyCat]

you wanna talk about banning someone

if i here you patting your back one more time over this dribble of an essay, i think im going to puke

your supposed insight to how the "jihadists" (LOL) work is a sham, and is just more typical western babble, that is so way off course from the truth

For god's sake, when you puke--cuz you will--please do make sure not to get it on anyone. I mean have some decency.

 

[SellyCat]

Anyway, the preceding paragraphs are from the first part of the report. Just to give you a taste.

Later on I might post about David Fraska. Actually one way you can tell that these 9/11 conspiracy theorists are full of shit is that they always get his name wrong. Even one of the better videos that I've seen--which was only trying to identify troubling questions--got a totally wack name instead of this guy. (He was the one who squashed the FISC warrant request while he was supposed to have known all about UBL's plans wrt aircraft from another memo he was a recipient of.)

 

[junglisthead]

have some decency ? you little essay is full of holes and generalizations, but yet you prance around here acting mightier than thou, asking for other members to be banned as they have a difference of opinion

your also the same one that uses the term "jihadist", as that itself shows how little you really know

in the end, you vililify the whole middle east issue, all in the while pretending you actually have some insightful knowledge

also your stubborness towards any alternative thoughts on 9/11 , shows how ridiculous you can be, you nor anyone else can be certain to what happened that eventful day

and it doesnt matter how many books or essay papers are written on the issue, there will be stuff that will never come to light for the average joe to see

 

[Vincent Vega]

Care to be specific and actually point out and correct so much as ONE of his statements? Or do you just want to be your usual trollish idiot self?

Where are his holes and generalizations? How has he "vilified" the whole middle eastern issue? What issue?

And, best of all, isn't he actually clearly exposing some flaws in the official version of 9/11? Or is Solgrabber's deranged garbage what you consider to be "alternative thoughts?" Did you even read his essay? If do, please see question #1 I asked you.

 

[SellyCat]

have some decency ? you little essay is full of holes and generalizations, but yet you prance around here acting mightier than thou, asking for other members to be banned as they have a difference of opinion

your also the same one that uses the term "jihadist", as that itself shows how little you really know

in the end, you vililify the whole middle east issue, all in the while pretending you actually have some insightful knowledge

also your stubborness towards any alternative thoughts on 9/11 , shows how ridiculous you can be, you nor anyone else can be certain to what happened that eventful day

and it doesnt matter how many books or essay papers are written on the issue, there will be stuff that will never come to light for the average joe to see

and in response

Care to be specific and actually point out and correct so much as ONE of his statements? Or do you just want to be your usual trollish idiot self?

Where are his holes and generalizations? How has he "vilified" the whole middle eastern issue? What issue?

And, best of all, isn't he actually clearly exposing some flaws in the official version of 9/11? Or is Solgrabber's deranged garbage what you consider to be "alternative thoughts?" Did you even read his essay? If do, please see question #1 I asked you.

So Junglisthead, let's have it. I have clearly sourced all my information (I will gladly provide the bibliography at the end of this post.)

I encourage you to challenge anything you see that is factually incorrect and provide your own legitimate sources. Considering my essay exposes some terrible injustices committed in the run-up to 9/11, I think you should simmer down until you actually read what I wrote. That fact that you don't know the history of Islamic militancy is kind of obvious now.

Works Cited

Aldrich, Gary. "FBI Headquarters." World Net Daily 30 May 2002. <http://worldnetdaily.com>.

Baer, Robert. Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude. N.p.: Crown, 2003.

Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002

Bergen, Peter L. Holy War, Inc.: Inside The Secret World of Osama Bin Laden. Free P, 2001.

Buncombe, Andrew. "FBI memo links British-based Islamic group to Al Qaeda terror suspects."
The Daily Times 25 May 2002. <http://www.dailytimes.com>.

Clarke, Richard A. Against All Enemies : Inside America's War on Terror. N.p.: Simon & Schuster Audio, 2004.

Elliott, Michael. "Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?" TIME 04 Aug. 2002. <http://www.time.com>.

Esposito, John L., ed. The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact. N.p.: University P of Florida, 1990.

Friedman, George. America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies. N.p.: Doubleday, 2004.

Graham, Bob, and Jeff Nessbaum. Intelligence Matters. N.p.: Random House, 2004.

Helmore, Edward. "Agent blasts FBI over 11 September 'cover-up'." The Guardian Unlimited 26 May 2002. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>.

History Now: The 9/11 Commission Report DVD. DVD. History Channel, 2004.

Johnston, David, and Don Van Natta Jr.. "Wary of Risk, Slow to Adapt, F.B.I. Stumbles in Terror War ." The New York TImes 02 June 2002. <http://www.nytimes.com>.

"In the Name of the State." The Age of Terror. Discovery. DISC-EU. 2002.

Nazer, Mehdi. Modernization, revolution and the Relevance of Iran's Islamic Republic
Political Culture to Foreign Policy Decision Making. Diss. Howard U, 2001.

Powers, Thomas. "Secrets of September 11." The New York Review of Books 10 Oct. 2002. <http://www.nybooks.com>.

Ratnasar, Romesh, and Michael Wiesskopf. "How The FBI Blew The Case." TIME 03 June 2002. <http://www.time.com>.

Rowley, Coleen. "Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller." TIME 21 May 2002. <http://www.time.com>.

Taylor Jr., Stuart. "The FBI and the CIA Are Not the Biggest Problems." National Journal 11 June 2002. <http://www.nationaljournal.com>.

"The Man Who Knew." Frontline. WGBH EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION. WGBH, Boston. 03 Oct. 2002. <http://http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/view/>.

The Oil Factor: Behind the War on Terror. Dir. Gerard Ungerman. DVD. Free Will Productions, 2004.

"The Phantom Victory." The Power of Nightmares. BBC Two. 19 Jan. 2005.

"Why We Fight." Storyville. BBC Four. 23 Mar. 2005

 

[SellyCat]

also your stubborness towards any alternative thoughts on 9/11 , shows how ridiculous you can be, you nor anyone else can be certain to what happened that eventful day

The 9/11 Commission concluded that, above all, a “failure of imagination”1 within the government caused a systemic inability to prevent the attacks against New York and Washington. This conclusion is both naïve and unjust...This episode exposed a severe integrity deficit among individuals within the intelligence community,especially in the FBI."

Honestly, if you read this thing, you might find A LOT of information about how fucked up this whole situation really was.

I'm talking about information that directly implicates specific individuals, agencies and decisions in the intelligence community and government. You would be doing yourself a disservice by not learning this information about "that eventful day"

 

[junglisthead]

wow from all your sources you have done your supposed research on, you only happened to use one potential muslim

talk about seeing a general perspective and not examining the whole scope of the matter at hand

then you use world net daily who is so far right wing

peter bergen who is a hack

richard clarke who is a weasel trying to get out of trouble

should i continue ?

 

[SellyCat]

wow from all your sources you have done your supposed research on, you only happened to use one potential muslim

talk about seeing a general perspective and not examining the whole scope of the matter at hand

then you use world net daily who is so far right wing

peter bergen who is a hack

richard clarke who is a weasel trying to get out of trouble

should i continue ?

Yes, I encourage you to continue for as long as you like.

Keep going.

 

[junglisthead]

Rowley, Coleen another sham who only looked out for herself and helped created the biggest lie america has seen in a trial,that being of zacharias moussaoui

Friedman, George another right wing hack, whose explanation of al qaida attacking america, is that they had no other enemy to contend with after the war against russia or his theory that we went to war with iraq was to merely scare saudi arabia LOL !!

Powers, Thomas who uses second hand knowledge, is still stuck in the cold war era

Baer, Robert self serving prick, who thinks everyone else was at fault and he was only a field officer, yet he knows what needs to be done to fix the cia ? please, you did nothing as a field agent what makes you think your suddenly an expert

 

[SellyCat]

I think your generalisations about these people are ignorant and childish--and obviously without ANY kind of support.

But at least you seem to know who they are. That's a decent start. You're still desperate to see everything through the optics that serve your narrow world-view.

^^^ In my opinion.

 

[Hamza]

This thread needs some Irshad Manji.........




obviously I'm being sarcastic

 

[SellyCat]

This thread needs some Irshad Manji.........




obviously I'm being sarcastic

What's so controversial about that? :|

 

[Hamza]

her hair.

 

[SellyCat]

her hair.

That's EXACTLY what my mom's hair looks like--it's kind of scary actually, now that I look more closely.