***OFFICIAL TRIBE REVIEW*** Blackhawk Down

Discussion in 'TRIBE Main Forum' started by el presidente Highsteppa, Jan 21, 2002.

  1. The ad campaign is highly misleading. Yes, there are tinges of American triumphing over all themes going on, and they did alter and play around with certain facts in order to make the film a little more dramatically palatable, but still, it often reiterates how much of a royal pooch screw this whole mission was and how they really didn't have a whole lot of business in being there in the first place. If you are a war film affectionado, this is a must see, but otherwise, you won't be any worse off missing it. It is good, it is a satisfying watch, but like I said, it is not a conventional film.
    The film does downplay a lot of the civilian casualties that were inflected on the Somalian civilians, but at the same time, the film also downplays a great deal of the Somalian tatics (many of the gunmen were aware of the U.S. and U.N. policy of not shooting civilians until they have a gun pointed at them or are shot at - in one case a gunman has two women standing in front of him, and three children on his back while he took shots at American troops - not exactly "the field of honour")

    From the Ministry of the book will offer a bit more to a history buff, but be warned of it's rather cold, factual narrative.

    Prime Minister Highsteppa
  2. G'Day Yurick. I knew thee like a walabee.

    Put a shrimp on the barbee and krikee, me dad is a ghost!

    From the Ministry of he belonged in the Shatner school of acting in that film.

    Prime Minister Highsteppa
  3. LivingRoomPornstar

    LivingRoomPornstar TRIBE Member

    you have an amusing affinity for exaggeration, James.


  4. *crushes Fosters can against forehead*

    To each their own dan [​IMG]

    From the Ministry of he did better with Braveheart, although I would've like to have seen a scotsman portrayed by someone in the same hemisphere, but Gibson did better there.

    Prime Minister Highsteppa
  5. LivingRoomPornstar

    LivingRoomPornstar TRIBE Member

    not nice.



    PS-that'll learn ya reeell gooood.
  6. *kicks stroller*

    [sneer]Yer kids are ugly, lady.[/sneer]

    From the Ministry of not a nice guy and calling your bluff. I drown kittens in my spare time.

    Prime Minister Highsteppa
  7. tommysmalls

    tommysmalls TRIBE Member

    great actors don't whore themselves to the masses (imho)
  8. Subsonic Chronic

    Subsonic Chronic TRIBE Member

    Gotta agree with you on pretty much everything James.

    I checked this out on the weekend... and left the theatre with the feeling of "that whole somalia mess was pretty much for nothing".

    There weren't any characters that I felt attached to, and it was a very emotionally detahced movie in general I felt. But the fighting scenes were done incredibly well and it gave me a pretty decent sense of how bad it can get when things start to go to shit.

    It's a pretty heavy movie that doesn't really have a "point" to it, but I'm still glad that I saw it.

  9. Guest

    Guest Guest

    It was a visually appealing movie but it lacked substance.
  10. Klubmasta Will

    Klubmasta Will TRIBE Member

    i wouldn't recommend this movie unless you have seen all the other good movies playing right now. i cannot *believe* this movie made so many top ten lists.

    it was like the first 20 minutes of SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (i.e. a brilliant, brutal, graphic battle scene) stretched out into 2 hours ... only not as well done as spielberg.
  11. Respect

    Respect TRIBE Member

    Originally posted by Klubmasta Will:
    i wouldn't recommend this movie unless you have seen all the other good movies playing right now. i cannot *believe* this movie made so many top ten lists.

    I think it's the function of the times - nations at war, everybody wants to support their man in uniform, and the easiest way to do that is to plunk down your ten bucks at the local AMC...

    [/b]it was like the first 20 minutes of SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (i.e. a brilliant, brutal, graphic battle scene) stretched out into 2 hours ... only not as well done as spielberg.[/B]

    Spielberg has a reputation of being emotionally manipulative, which discredits most of his films (somewhat in Schindlers List, completely in AI.) There was no such manipulation in this movie - beyond flinching at some of the gore, O think the impression they were going for was "shitty to be caught in a mess like this" (as opposed to mythologizing DDay like Spielberg, or pretentious mindfucking like Apocalypse Now, or black humour like Full Metal Jacket.)

    The movie did a good job of resignedly laying the blame on their political taskmasters, but doing your duty anyway. The only problems I had were at the beginning, with some of the hackneyed stereotypes they lay out for some of the characters (the clown, the idealist, the oakley-wearing rebel, etc.), and the fact that they almost ignored the idea that the Somalis were pissed off at having tons of machinery flying over their houses, shooting, destroying their homes, etc. - hence the mobs. "Three Kings" did a better job at putting the conflict in a balanced political context. Black Hawk Down frankly doesn't care about the political context, but it makes you believe that they did their jobs, and exceptionally, under lousy circumstances, without getting cartoonish... and if you're sympathetic to that ideal, you'll love this movie.
  12. Subsonic Chronic

    Subsonic Chronic TRIBE Member

    Agreed. There is a lot more about the situation in Somalia that I would have liked to have known, besides the simple "Americans went into Somalia and this was one of their missions" that they present in the movie.

    I've only recently begun reading up on it, but there's a long history that goes back to the U.S.S.R., Ethiopia, and the U.S.'s involvement as far as toppling regimes and making a bigger mess of an already bad situation for their own benefit.

  13. matty

    matty TRIBE Member

    Guess what the character Ewan McGregor is playing is currently serving a 30 year sentence for raping a girl under 12. Nice guy to glorify.

    Another Review http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=114013

    In the 1970s and 1980s, Somalia was ruled by a corrupt president, Mohamed Siad Barre. It was a familiar story – an unpopular, despotic nutcase (read, Pinochet in Chile or the Shah in Iran) who suppressed popular dissent and did what the US government, or US-owned multinationals, told him to do.

    By his last days in power, Siad Barre had leased nearly two-thirds of Somalia to four huge American oil companies: Conoco, Chevron, Phillips, and Amoco (the story presumably involves British business interests also, since Amoco is now part of BP). The land was believed by geologists to contain substantial quantities of oil and natural gas.

    In 1991, unfortunately for the oil giants, Siad Barre was overthrown, and he fled the country. Somalia – as a functioning nation state with which they could do business – fell apart. The oil giants' exclusive concessions to explore and drill were worthless in the absence of a viable government to enforce their claims.

    In the early 1990s, there were various humanitarian disasters also deserving of urgent intervention. For the United States to spearhead a United Nations mission to Somalia was, from a humanitarian viewpoint, capricious. But, citing famine in Mogadishu and in the southern part of the country, and an urgent need to restore order, President Bush I sent in the Marines.

    The United States meant business in Somalia: this was obvious from the location of the American embassy, established a few days before the US marines arrived in Mogadishu, in the Conoco corporate compound. The Los Angeles Times reported that Bush's special envoy to Somalia had used the Conoco compound as his temporary headquarters.

    The marines – along with their United Nations "partners" – settled down to their tasks of guarding American oil men and disarming the unruly populace. It didn't go well. On 7 May 1993, the Canadian press reported that elite Airborne Regiment Commandos in Somalia had tortured and murdered a civilian teenager, Shidane Arone. Other reports of murder by Canadian peacekeepers followed.

    As for the Americans, having encouraged the ambitions of a Somali general and clan leader, Mohammed Aideed, they decided (shades of Osama Bin Laden!) that Aideed was their enemy. Half-a-dozen "United Nations" missions were dispatched to capture him. All failed.

    On 3 October 1993, a team of so-called "elite troops" – Delta Force Rangers – tried to capture Aideed again, in central Mogadishu. Aideed wasn't there, but the American troops became confused. Shortly after, they were surrounded by angry crowds. In the massacre that followed, between 500 and 1,000 Somalis, many of them women, children, and old people, were killed. Eighteen Americans also died.

    Of course, it is the American deaths, and the TV image of a couple of American bodies being dragged by enraged Somalis, rather than guilt over the massacre of hundreds of Africans, that haunts the popular-American-media mind. There wasn't a massacre. There was a firefight. Only Americans lost their lives.

    In the aftermath of 3 October 1993, various articles appeared about the shootout/massacre, including internet postings by Mark Bowden and pieces in the Philadelphia Inquirer. In 1999, Bowden's book Black Hawk Down appeared.

    It's interesting to observe how the story was re-told over that time. An article by the former Independent correspondent Richard Dowden the previous year makes the clear point that US troops killed unarmed men, women and children from the outset of their mission: "In one incident, Rangers took a family hostage. When one of the women started screaming at the Americans, she was shot dead. In another incident, a Somali prisoner was allegedly shot dead when he refused to stop praying outside. Another was clubbed into silence. The killer is not identified." Dowden's original articles contain these horror stories. But his book does not. Instead, Black Hawk Down gives us lashings of extraordinary heroism in the face of blah, blah, blah. Rolf Harris singing "Two Little Boys". Sanitized and deodorized Death From Above.

    The author of Black Hawk Down is aware of the problem with these "elite, superior, special forces": they are all white. But he doesn't deal with what that elite whiteness means, or where it leads. The American elite forces couldn't perform their central role in Somalia – to protect the oil business – because they were white racists, untrained and unable to relate to a humanitarian mission in Africa, even when corporate money was involved. The House Armed Services Committee laid the problem on the line the following year, 1994, in a comprehensive report on the state of racial affairs within the US military – An Assessment of Racial Discrimination in the Military: a Global Perspective, 30 December 1994, US Government Printing Office.

    The committee sent investigators to 19 military bases at home and abroad, where they interviewed 2,000 randomly selected GIs. They found that overt racism was "commonplace" at four of the bases, and that inadequate training in racial awareness was a widespread problem.

    Another task force, which investigated organised racism in the US Army, said the problem was particularly serious in all-white, so-called "elite" and "Special Operations" units. Such racial separatism could lead to problems, its report warned, because it "foster supremacist attitudes among white combat soldiers". (The Secretary of the Army's Task Force Report on Extremist Activities, Defending American Values, 21 March 1996, Washington DC, page 15.)

    The Somalia mission ended in disarray. The Americans and the "United Nations" allies left. In the aftermath of the massacre, Canada, Italy and Belgium all held enquiries into the excesses of their troops. Canada put several "elite" white soldiers, who had tortured and killed Somalis, on trial. The US has never held any public investigation or reprimanded any of its commanders or troops for what went on in Somalia.

    Now the US prepares for another mission to Mogadishu. It may take the form of bombings, or of a poor Somali academic, harassed by the State Department and CIA into offering himself up as sacrificial prime minister in another doomed governance experiment. It involves a substantial propaganda angle. The oil business is all powerful, and must be obeyed.

    Not that I'm suggesting that the forthcoming film of Black Hawk Down, directed by Ridley Scott, is anything so crude as that. I'm sure that it will be even-handed, and depict its protagonists exactly as they were in life, skin pigment and all. And I look forward to the sensitive handling of Ewan McGregor's character: elite, white GI John "Stebby" Stebbins, renamed as Company Clerk John Grimes in the film, who is now serving a 30-year sentence in Fort Leavenworth military prison for raping a 12-year-old girl. Massacres and rapes are horrible things. No one would stoop to glorify, or justify them, would they?

    The current US military doctrine is something called "Full Spectrum Dominance". It is the brainchild of several other mighty corporations and the Pentagon. Consisting of putting weapons in orbit in outer space, it will mean the US is an even greater, more unstable, military power – in heaven as here on earth. It – along with anti-ballistic missile systems and the murder of prisoners of war – is currently illegal under international law.

    If British politicians go along with the next war, on Somalia, or on Iraq; if they loan the country to the US for their Star Wars and Echelon; if noted British film-makers like Ridley and Tony Scott (coming soon! Top Gun reality TV!) do devote themselves to burnishing the image of an elite US military in films like Black Hawk Down, perhaps it's time for a debate in Britain about what America's "Full Spectrum Dominance" really means.

    Alex Cox has just completed 'Revengers Tragedy', a British film, for Bard Entertainments and Exterminating Angel
  14. Subsonic Chronic

    Subsonic Chronic TRIBE Member

  15. Klubmasta Will

    Klubmasta Will TRIBE Member

    it's his ability to evoke strong emotions that makes spielberg well ... spielberg.

    the opening 20 minutes of SAVING PRIVATE RYAN is not like any moment in any other spielberg film, except for perhaps SCHINDLER'S LIST. it was the most horrifying battle scene ever shot. absolutely horrifying and almost certainly an influence on the way ridley scott shot BLACKHAWK DOWN. it was not as outright shocking in BLACKHAWK DOWN though because the bar has been raised (and we've been spoiled) by SPR, BAND OF BROTHERS, et al.

    i agree. i noticed some similarities here as well, especially when the american was taken hostage.

    the hostage scene in THREE KINGS was one of my favourites from any war movie. ("my main man ... what the fuck is up with michael jackson? heeee heeee .... hoooo hooooo")
  16. vox

    vox TRIBE Member

    yeah thanks...although i'm afraid i don't share your optimism for the movie.
  17. Respect

    Respect TRIBE Member

    m..m - great article. Sure hope some independent director tries to tackle a movie from the other side. I definitely want to see the new "Bloody Sunday" movie that's making waves at Sundance.

    Personally, I draw a distinction between doing your job and who you are. The two are not necessarily the same.

    History is full of heroes who have distinguished themselves doing their duty, but being utter failures as human beings. I think the military is inherently racist, but I still respect them for the ability to do their jobs under near-impossible circumstances.

    Also consider this: sometimes their battlefield heroics contribute to their downfall as people. You rise to the occasion and are glorified; real life suddenly seems hard to handle. When you're in an environment where regular morals are routinely, even casually, circumvented - killing people, having people killed around you - coming back to "mundane reality" can be tough. And if you lack inner strength to do that, you can snap.

    In no way is this excusing Stebbins for his crimes, but like I said, history is littered with people without that inner strength who have folded, dying as drunks or by suicide.
    Vietnam War vets are a good example... one of the flag-raising guys at Iwo Jima (immortalized by the memorial statue) was like that. I can't help but feel sorry for guys like that - politics thrust you into a shitty situation, you do your job which involves some pretty shitty stuff, and then you're thanked and left with whatever garbage you've accumulated inside.

    Many deign to offhandedly pass judgement on people and situations they have absolutely no clue about. Hell, I snap when work gets too busy, but when I see stuff like this, I only wonder how I would handle it.
  18. vox

    vox TRIBE Member

    here's some more information about somalia's political history:

    The Long and Hidden History of the U.S in Somalia
    Stephen Zunes, AlterNet
    January 17, 2002

    The East African nation of Somalia is being mentioned with increasing frequency as the next possible target in the U.S.-led war against international terrorism. With what passes for the central government controlling little more than a section of the national capital of Mogadishu, a separatist government in the north, and rival warlords and clan leaders controlling most of the rest of the country, U.S. officials believe that cells of the Al-Qaida terrorist network may have taken advantage of the absence of governmental authority to set up operation.

    Before the United States attacks that impoverished country, however, it is important to know how Somalia became a possible haven for the followers of Osama Bin Laden and what might result if the United States goes to war.

    As one of the most homogeneous countries in Africa, many would have not predicted the chronic instability and violent divisions which have gripped Somalia in recent years. During the early 1970s, Somalia was a client of the Soviet Union, even allowing the Soviets to establish a naval base at Berbera on the strategic north coast near the entrance to the Red Sea. Somali dictator Siad Barre established this relationship in response to the large-scale American military support of Somalia's historic rival Ethiopia, then under the rule of the feudal emperor Haile Selassie. When a military coup by leftist Ethiopian officers toppled the monarchy in 1974 and declared the country a Marxist-Leninist state the following year, the superpowers switched their allegiances, with the Soviet Union backing the Ethiopia Dirgue and the United States siding with the Barre regime in Somalia.

    In 1977, Somalia attacked the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia in an effort to incorporate the area's ethnic Somali population. The Ethiopians were eventually able to repel the attack with large-scale Soviet military support and 20,000 Cuban troops. Zbigniew Brzezinski, then-National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, has since claimed that this conflict sparked the end of détente with the Soviet Union and the renewal of the Cold War.

    From the late 1970s until just before Siad Barre's overthrow in early 1991, the U.S. sent hundreds of millions of dollars of arms to Somalia in return for the use of military facilities which had been originally constructed for the Soviets. These bases were to be used to support American military intervention in the Middle East. The consequences of U.S. military support for the Barre regime on the Somali people was deemed of little importance by American policymakers. The U.S. government ignored warnings throughout the 1980s by Africa specialists, human rights groups and humanitarian organizations that continued American aid to the dictatorial government of Siad Barre would eventually plunge Somalia into chaos.

    These predictions proved tragically accurate. During the nearly fifteen years of support by the United States and Italy, thousands of civilians were massacred at the hands of Barre's increasingly authoritarian regime. Full-scale civil war erupted in 1988 and the repression increased still further, with clan leaders in the northern third of the country declaring independence to escape government persecution. In greatly centralizing his government's control, Barre severely weakened traditional structures in Somali society which had kept civil order for many years. To help maintain his grip on power, Barre played different Somali clans against each other, sowing the seeds of the fratricidal chaos to come, which in turn would contribute to mass starvation and spur the ill-fated humanitarian intervention by the United States in 1992.

    Meanwhile, by eliminating all potential rivals with a national following, a power vacuum was created by Barre that could not be filled when the U.S.-backed regime was finally overthrown in January 1991, an event barely noticed outside the country as world attention was focused on the start of the Gulf War. With the end of the Cold War and the United States now granted bases in the Persian Gulf itself, Somalia fell briefly off the radar screen of U.S. foreign policy.

    There is widespread agreement among those familiar with Somalia that had the U.S. government not supported the Barre regime with large amounts of military aid, he would have been forced to step down long before his misrule splintered the country. Prior to the dictator's downfall, former U.S. Representative Howard Wolpe, then-chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, called on the State Department to encourage Barre to step down. His pleas were rejected. "What you are seeing," observed the Congressman and former professor of African Politics, "is a general indifference to a disaster that we played a role in creating."

    A U.S. diplomat who had been stationed in the Somali capital of Mogadishu acknowledged, "It's easy to blame us for all this." But, he argued, "This is a sovereign country we're taking about. They have chosen to spend [U.S. military aid] that way, to hurt people and destroy their own economy."

    As the United States poured in more than $50 million of arms annually to prop up the Barre regime, there was virtually no assistance offered that would have helped build a selfsustaining economy which could feed Somalia's people. In addition, the United States pushed a structural adjustment program through the International Monetary Fund which severely weakened the local agricultural economy. Combined with the breakdown of the central government, drought conditions and rival militias disrupting food supplies, there was famine on a massive scale, resulting in the deaths of more than 300,000 Somalis, mostly children.

    In November 1992, the outgoing Bush administration sent 30,000 U.S. troops, primarily Marines and Army Rangers, to Somalia in what was described as a humanitarian mission to assist in the distribution of relief supplies which were being intercepted by armed militias without reaching the civilian population in need. The United Nations Security Council endorsed the initiative the following month. Many Somalis and some relief organizations were grateful for the American role. Many others expressed skepticism, noting that the famine had actually peaked that summer and the security situation was also improving gradually. At this point, the chaos limiting food shipments was limited to a small area; most areas functioned as relatively peaceful fiefdoms. Most food was getting through and the loss from theft was only slightly higher than elsewhere in Africa. In some cases, U.S. forces essentially dumped food on local markets, hurting indigenous farmers and creating greater food shortages over the longer term. In any case, few Somalis were involved in the decisions during this crucial period.

    Most importantly for the United States, large numbers of Somalis saw the American forces as representatives of the government which served as the major Western supporter of the hated former dictatorship. Such an overbearing foreign military presence in a country which had been free from colonial rule for only a little more than three decades led to growing resentment, particularly since these elite combat forces were not trained for such humanitarian missions. (Author and journalist David Halberstam quotes the U.S. Secretary of Defense telling an associate, "We're sending the Rangers to Somalia. We are not going to be able to control them. They are like overtrained pit bulls. No one controls them.") Shootings at U.S. military roadblocks became increasingly commonplace and Somalis witnessed scenes of mostly white American forces harassing and shooting their black countrymen.

    In addition, the U.S. role escalated to include attempts at disarming some of the war lords, resulting in armed engagements, often in crowded urban neighborhoods. This "mission creep" resulted in American casualties, creating growing dissent at home in what had originally been a widely-supported foreign policy initiative. The thousands of M16 rifles sent, courtesy of the American taxpayer, to Barre's armed forces were now in the hands of rival militiamen who had not only used them to kill their fellow countrymen and to disrupt the distribution of relief supplies, but were now using them against American troops It wasn't long before the slogan of American forces was "The only good Somali is a dead Somali." It had become apparent that the U.S. had badly underestimated the resistance.

    The United States passed the mission on to the United Nations in May the following year, marking the first time the world body had combined peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance. It was also the first time the UN has intervened without a formal invitation by a host government (because there wasn't any.) But Somalis had little trust of the United Nations, either, particularly since the UN Secretary General at that time was Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a major supporter of Barre when he led Egypt's foreign ministry. U.S. forces, now leading the UN mission, went on increasingly aggressive forays, including a major battle in Mogadishu which resulted in the deaths of 18 Marines and hundreds of Somali civilians, dramatized in the highly-fictionalized thriller Black Hawk Down. The U.S.-led UN forces had become yet another faction in the multi-sided conflict. Largely retreating to a fixed position, the primary American objective soon became protecting its own forces. With mounting criticism on Capitol Hill from both the left and the right, President Bill Clinton withdrew American troops in March 1994. The United Nations pulled its last peacekeeping forces out one year later.

    The U.S. intervention in Somalia is now widely considered to have been a fiasco. It is largely responsible for the subsequent U.S. hesitation about so-called humanitarian intervention outside of high-altitude bombing. It was the major factor in the tragic U.S. refusal to intervene either unilaterally or through the United Nations to prevent the genocide in Rwanda during the spring of 1994. The Somalia intervention was most likely an ill-advised assertion of well-meaning liberal internationalism, though there may have been other factors prompting the American decision to intervene as well: perhaps as a rationalization for increased military spending despite the end of the Cold War; an effort to mollify the Islamic world for American overkill in the war against Iraq and the inaction against the massacres of Muslims in Bosnia; and possibly as a preemptive operation against possible Islamic extremists rising out of the chaos. If the latter was the goal, it may have backfired. Islamic radicals were able to find some willing recruits among the Somalis, already upset by the U.S. support for Barre, now additionally angry at the destruction wrought by direct U.S. military intervention in their country.

    In subsequent years, there has been only marginal progress towards establishing any kind of widely-recognized national government. Somalia is still divided into fiefdoms run by clan leaders and warlords, though there is rarely any serious fighting. Some officials in the current Bush Administration believe that Al-Qaida has established an important network or active cells within this factious country.

    If this is indeed the case, it begs the question as to how the United States should respond. It is possible that U.S. forces have access to remarkably accurate intelligence and would be able to pinpoint and take out the cells without once again becoming embroiled in the messy urban counter-insurgency warfare of 1993-94 or relying on air strikes in heavily-populated areas, which would result in large-scale civilian casualties. Based on the current methods employed by the Bush administration to combat terrorism, however, this is rather doubtful. The result of renewed U.S. military intervention in Somalia, then, could be yet another debacle which would only encourage the extremist forces we are trying to destroy.
  19. Respect

    Respect TRIBE Member

    Originally posted by Klubmasta Will:
    it's his ability to evoke strong emotions that makes spielberg well ... spielberg.

    And that what makes him a filmmaker I seriously dislike... he never gives you any credit for being able to think.

    the opening 20 minutes of SAVING PRIVATE RYAN is not like any moment in any other spielberg film, except for perhaps SCHINDLER'S LIST. it was the most horrifying battle scene ever shot. absolutely horrifying and almost certainly an influence on the way ridley scott shot BLACKHAWK DOWN. it was not as outright shocking in BLACKHAWK DOWN though because the bar has been raised (and we've been spoiled) by SPR, BAND OF BROTHERS, et al.

    I agree - total bandwagon jumping. There was a pretty good HBO movie called "When Trumpets Fade" with Ron Eldard (he played Durant in Black Hawk Down" that came out a little before Saving Ryans Privates - total gory realism for battle of the bulge, ripped torsos, etc. Another one called "The Lost Battalion" on A&E with Ricky Shroeder - also a really horribly manipulative movie, capped off with some "Melting Pot" American jingoism...

    I don't think Black Hawk Down was merely American propaganda. You could tell Ridley Scott is a filmmaker, first and foremost. I though it was a very good movie that never went for the cheap heart stab.

    i agree. i noticed some similarities here as well, especially when the american was taken hostage.

    the hostage scene in THREE KINGS was one of my favourites from any war movie. ("my main man ... what the fuck is up with michael jackson? heeee heeee .... hoooo hooooo")

    Great movie indeed, very subtle fiction that mirrored one of the main points of whole war (greed).
  20. Subsonic Chronic

    Subsonic Chronic TRIBE Member

    vox you rock too. [​IMG]
  21. vox

    vox TRIBE Member

    werd, dawg.

  22. vox

    vox TRIBE Member

    but that's the problem when you transpose "filmaking" over real events. millions of people who see this are going to see EWAN MCGREGOR, or JOSH HARNETT, not the faces of the people who were there, and taken out of any historical/social context, it becomes just another story that has to fulfil various narrative constructs that we are enculturated to expect from film.
  23. Respect

    Respect TRIBE Member

    I agree with this... I also saw a documentary on the topic on CNN, and I was surprised that I was surprised that it was sterile compared to the film.

    But I also believe this: historical / social context is important to understand, but that doesn't necessarily make a "good movie." The context isn't just history / social stuff either - the agenda the film follows is just as valid as the issues with oil, or warlords. The bottom line is that a good film happens when everyone gets what they want from it, from their own personal situation. A bad film is one that tries to club you over the head with its agenda (see Spielberg, above.) Black Hawk Down doesn't do this.

    The globe takes your point of view: "not enough political context." It goes on to quote a character in the film as saying "at the end of the day, it's all about the people beside you," and then says, "um, sorry, no it isn't: you gotta have more political context."

    The globe got it wrong. In the film, to the characters, it *is* all about the man beside you. The film had an agenda, and it executed it, well and more subtly than people give it credit for: the result is a good film. Critics make the mistake of enforcing their own agenda on their review.

    (I also think the medium of film is far richer than to be held hostage by enculturation... although it is hard to escape considering all the money that goes into it.)

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